The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority by Devins, Neal & Herz, Michael
DEVINS.FMT.DOC 12/10/98 9:20 AM
THE BATTLE THAT NEVER WAS:
CONGRESS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND
AGENCY LITIGATION AUTHORITY
NEAL DEVINS* AND MICHAEL HERZ**
I
INTRODUCTION
Who should speak the government’s voice in court?  Specifically, are the in-
terests of the United States better represented by generalist litigators in the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or agency lawyers with subject matter exper-
tise?  For DOJ and agency lawyers, this question is of monumental importance.
For members of Congress and their staff, however, this question is almost al-
ways a nonstarter.
Witness, for example, our experience in conducting a study for the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) on DOJ control of gov-
ernment litigation.1  Before the study was approved, C. Boyden Gray, President
Bush’s White House Counsel and a member of ACUS’s board, insisted that the
project be blessed by Clinton Justice Department officials.  Once approved,2
the project provoked dramatically different responses from agency and DOJ
officials as well as congressional overseers.  For agency lawyers, our project was
a breath of fresh air—a chance to extol their underutilized litigation skills and
vent frustration at DOJ.  For some DOJ officials, our project was an invitation
to disaster.  Indeed, our inquiries about the distribution of litigation authority
prompted one high-ranking DOJ official to lobby ACUS to kill the project.  In
the halls of Congress, however, staffers on the Senate Judiciary and House En-
ergy and Commerce committees wondered why two law professors would in-
vest so much energy in a project that held so little interest.
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1. The study was cut short by Congress’ defunding of the Administrative Conference.  Our re-
search findings can be found in Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Jus-
tice Control of Government Litigation (in progress).  In The Uneasy Case, we consider the appropriate
allocation of litigating authority on the merits from, we hope, a neutral position.  In the present article,
we ignore the merits and consider instead the interests at stake and the politics of the issue.
2. Clinton friend and then Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell wrote a letter on our
behalf.   We hasten to say that rumors that this letter prompted Ken Starr, a DOJ official in the Rea-
gan and Bush Administrations, to file criminal charges against Hubbell are simply untrue.  Starr’s in-
vestigation of the President and his friends is in fact part of a “vast right-wing conspiracy.”
DEVINS.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  9:20 AM
206 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 1
Differences between congressional and “administrative branch” attitudes
were also underscored in our involvement in a bitter dispute over litigation
authority that embroiled the Bush White House and the U.S. Postal Service.3
In particular, claiming statutory authority to represent itself in court, the Postal
Service refused to bend to demands that it withdraw from a lawsuit that it filed
against the Postal Rate Commission—demands made by the Justice Depart-
ment, the White House counsel, and, ultimately, the President, who threatened
to remove the Postal Service’s Board of Governors for insubordination.
Throughout this struggle, Congress—notwithstanding several front-page
Washington Post stories as well as Postal Service lobbying—expressed no
opinion on Postal Service litigation authority.  Rather, Congress left it to the
courts to sort out the scope of the removal power and the appropriate division
of litigation authority.4
In part, the explanation for this difference could not be more obvious.  For
the lawyers themselves, the allocation of authority is personal; it directly affects
their power and the nature of their jobs.  It is hardly a surprise that lawyers in
DOJ and lawyers in the agencies both would prefer more rather than less re-
sponsibility.  Members of Congress and their staffs lack this personal stake in
the question of litigation authority.
Nevertheless, Congress’ seeming indifference to the division of litigation
authority, at first glance, seems surprising.  After all, courts figure prominently
in governmental policymaking and, as such, the question of who speaks the
government’s voice in court seems anything but immaterial.  Congress is ex-
traordinarily concerned about who the judges are; for the same, though slightly
more dilute reasons, it ought to be concerned about who the lawyers are.  Fur-
thermore, since most departments and agencies are far more vulnerable to
committee oversight than is DOJ, decentralizing litigation authority would ap-
pear to bolster congressional power.
Upon closer inspection, however, it may be that Congress’ choice to invest
little energy in parceling out litigation authority is sensible.  In our view, the
distribution of litigation authority among executive branch agencies and de-
partments is of marginal consequence to Congress.  Through its lawmaking and
oversight powers, Congress has more powerful and direct tools for defining the
scope and content of legal policymaking.  In contrast, centralizing litigation
authority in DOJ does significantly bolster presidential control of the adminis-
                                                          
3. Neal Devins worked as a consultant to the Postal Service.  Michael Herz, through his scholar-
ship and insights, assisted in this effort.  For a recounting of this dispute, see Neal Devins, Tempest in
an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White House’s Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1035 (1994).
4. In stark contrast, when President Bush, in the midst of this dispute, attempted to make a recess
appointment to the Postal Service’s Board of Governors, the Service’s congressional overseers were up
in arms, sending a blistering bipartisan letter of protest to the White House.  Apparently, Congress saw
Bush’s recess appointment as a threat to lawmaker prerogatives—the power to confirm presidential
appointees.  The litigation authority dispute did not raise such concerns.  Instead, because the Postal
Service wanted to raise postal rates, constituent interests—rather than pressure Congress to inter-
vene—supported the White House.
DEVINS.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  9:20 AM
Page 205: Winter 1998] AGENCY LITIGATION AUTHORITY 207
trative state, and so is a more salient issue for the Executive Branch.  Thus,
when litigation authority is placed against the backdrop of the intensity of con-
flicting preferences within Congress and the Executive Branch, DOJ control of
government litigation is hardly surprising.
II
THE ALLOCATION OF LITIGATION AUTHORITY
Historically, Congress well understood that a decentralized lawyering appa-
ratus enhanced its authority vis-à-vis the President.5  For this very reason, in the
early years of the Republic, Congress relied on highly decentralized legal ar-
rangements.  It did not create DOJ until 1870.  Even with DOJ in place, for the
next half-century, powerful solicitors in other departments undermined Attor-
ney General control of government litigation by successfully lobbying their al-
lies in Congress for independent litigation authority.6  Through powers granted
the President by Congress only a few months earlier,7 however, Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt issued a June 1933 Executive Order that confined to DOJ “the
responsibility of prosecuting and defending [c]ourt actions to which the United
States is a party.”8
Consistent with the Roosevelt Executive Order, Congress has established
DOJ as the primary litigator for the United States and its administrative agen-
cies.  The basic, though not inflexible, rule is that agencies may not employ out-
side counsel for litigation; they must refer all matters to DOJ.9  With regard to
criminal prosecution, DOJ’s preeminence goes largely and appropriately un-
questioned.  On the civil side, however, it is a source of continuing controversy
between DOJ and the agencies.  DOJ is constantly on guard against the dilu-
                                                          
5. See Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 175, 192-99
(1993).
6. In fact, on the eve of the New Deal, Attorney General John Sargent reported to Congress that
only 115 of 900 federally employed attorneys were under his control, and at least nine separate gov-
ernment agencies or departments had independent litigation authority.  See CORNELL W. CLAYTON,
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 75
(1992).
7. See Act of March 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-428, § 16, 47 Stat. 1489, 1517-20.  Responding to the
economic crisis and the need for increased governmental efficiency, Congress granted the President
broad reorganization authority, including the power to “[t]ransfer the whole or any part of any execu-
tive agency and/or the functoins thereof to the jurisdiction and control of any other executive agency.”
Id., 47 Stat. at 1518 (creating a new § 403 of the legislative Appropriations Act of 1933).
8. Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1994) (note).  President Wilson
had previously centralized all governmental legal authority within DOJ through Exec. Order No. 2877
(1918), but the change was largely ineffective and, in any event, temporary.  See NANCY V. BAKER,
CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789-1990, at
63 (1992).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . . . is reserved to officers of [DOJ],
under the direction of the Attorney General.”); id. § 519 (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the
Attorney General shall supervise all [such] litigation . . . .”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1994) (“Except
as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an Executive department or military department may not
employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or
employee thereof is a party . . . but shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice.”).
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tion of what it deems its proper role as lawyer for the government,10 and the
agencies have all chafed under the arrangement to a greater or lesser extent.  In
the words of one former head of DOJ’s Civil Division, “[t]he warfare over liti-
gation authority never ends. . . .”11
This war is one that Congress largely observes from the sidelines.  It has
only occasionally taken an interest in the propriety of DOJ control of govern-
ment litigation.  For example, in the late 1970s, at a time when the Executive
Branch was doing its own study of the allocation of legal resources and the is-
sue seemed more up for grabs than it does today, several across-the-board pro-
posals for independent litigating authority were introduced.  However, the pro-
posals never went anywhere, and they remain the exception to the general rule
of extremely episodic and unfocused congressional interest in this question.
To be sure, Congress has carved out a variety of exceptions to DOJ con-
trol.12  However, these exceptions have been anything but systematic.  A slight
pattern can be found:  Congress grants litigating authority more often to inde-
pendent agencies than to executive agencies, but it does not grant such author-
ity to all such agencies, to all the litigation of any such agencies, or only to such
agencies.  Other than this tendency, it would be difficult to find any overarching
principle on the merits that explains when Congress departs from the presump-
tive arrangement of DOJ control.
III
LITIGATION AUTHORITY MATTERS . . . BUT NOT THAT MUCH
Litigation authority, inextricably linked to the ebbs and flows of congres-
sional and presidential power, is part and parcel of the ongoing dialogue be-
tween the branches over the control of the administrative state.  The content of
regulatory policy, moreover, is affected by the distribution of litigation author-
ity.  With so much apparently at stake, fierce battles between Congress and the
White House over litigation authority should be commonplace.  For the most
part, however, Congress and the White House do not skirmish over this ques-
tion.  The simple explanation for this phenomenon is that, for Congress at least,
litigation authority does not matter all that much.
                                                          
10. See, e.g., Griffin Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and
Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1978); The Attorney Gen-
eral’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982).
11. Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 186 (1990).  Writing about conflict between DOJ and the agencies in 1978,
one journalist observed that “[t]he historical struggle over legal control suggests that [President
Jimmy] Carter has about as much prospect of satisfying the contending parties as he does of getting
Menachem Begin and Anwar el-Sadat to agree on Mideast boundaries.”  Richard Cohen, Government
Lawyers Battle for Independence, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 12, 1978, at 1286.
12. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control of Independent
Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-74 (1994); Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper:
The Debate over Federal Litigating Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 71 (1984).
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A.  The Sometimes Importance of Litigation Authority
Court arguments affect outcomes, and who the lawyers are affects what ar-
guments are made.  Accordingly, it seems nearly certain that litigation author-
ity is consequential.  Consider, for example, Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ In-
ternational Association v. EEOC.13  Before a federal appeals court, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) attorneys successfully de-
fended the authority of federal courts to order affirmative action hiring in an
employment discrimination lawsuit.  Before the Supreme Court, however, the
Solicitor General, not the pro-plaintiff EEOC, controlled the government’s
filings.  Unlike the EEOC, the Solicitor General took into account the interests
of DOJ’s Civil Division, which defends employment discrimination challenges
filed against executive agencies and departments, and, more importantly, the
interests of the Reagan White House, which opposed affirmative action.  The
result:  The Solicitor General unilaterally reversed the EEOC’s position in a
brief it filed on its behalf.14  For its part, the Supreme Court, referring to this
flip flop, embraced the lower court arguments of EEOC attorneys, refusing to
defer to the EEOC’s newly minted position.15  Had DOJ attorneys controlled
the case from its inception, there is good reason to think that the case would
have settled or, alternatively, that a different substantive outcome would have
been reached.16
A less high-profile but equally telling example of the consequential nature
of litigation authority is Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules, Inc.,17 a
lawsuit between private parties which turned in part on the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) Clean Water Act regulations.18  Since EPA’s regu-
lations were at issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrote to
the EPA General Counsel’s Office, stating that “[t]he court believes that the
views of the [EPA] would be helpful” and requesting that “you file a brief ami-
cus curiae.”19  What it received was a brief from DOJ, not signed by an agency
lawyer, setting forth the views of the “United States.”20  On the merits, the brief
took a middle ground, reflecting DOJ’s efforts to reconcile the EPA’s interest
                                                          
13. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
14. See Devins, supra note 12, at 296-301.
15. See 478 U.S. at 481-83; cf. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (deferring to EEOC ex-
pertise).
16. With DOJ lawyers speaking the voice of the EEOC, there would be no opportunity for an in-
tragovernmental conflict to be uncovered, especially since the EEOC lacks administrative “cease and
desist” authority.  Consequently, by controlling the case from its inception, DOJ arguments would be
accorded whatever deference is owed the government.
17. 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995).
18. The particular issue concerned the scope and specificity required for the 60-day notice that
must precede filing of a complaint in a citizen’s enforcement action under the Act.  EPA’s regulations
address the question of what constitutes an adequate 60-day notice.  See 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (1997).
19. Letter from P. Douglas Sisk, Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to Susan
Lipow, Associate General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency (June 13, 1994) (on file with
author).
20. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2 n.1, Public Interest Group v. Hercules, Inc.,
50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 93-5720, 93-5721).
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in strong enforcement with the competing interests of other federal agencies,
notably the Departments of Defense and Energy, that find themselves the
subject of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act.  No doubt, had EPA con-
trolled this filing, it would have asserted a more expansive interpretation of the
statute.  Alternatively, if the issue presented to the court in Hercules had origi-
nated in a lawsuit filed against the Department of Energy, decentralizing litiga-
tion authority would have resulted in a narrower construction of the Act.
Cases like Sheetmetal Workers and Hercules make clear that government
agencies and departments may have conflicting agendas.  Mission agencies like
EEOC and EPA, “dominated not by the employers and organizations being
regulated but by representatives of the constituencies being served,”21 almost
certainly will advance a pro-enforcement agenda.  For this very reason, when
Congress crafted clean air legislation in 1970, a fight erupted between pro-
environmentalists in the Senate, who wanted EPA to represent itself in court,
and pro-business interests in the House, who wanted EPA to rely on DOJ.22
More is at stake here than which arguments are made once a case is in
court; there is also the issue of whether the case will get to court at all.  While
defensive actions are not in the control of government attorneys, of course, en-
forcement actions are.  If agencies must go to DOJ to bring a lawsuit, at least
some of the time DOJ will say no, particularly since, to overgeneralize, DOJ
lawyers care more about not losing in court and, therefore, are more cautious
than agency lawyers, whose raison d’être is advancing agency priorities.  In the
area of intragovernmental enforcement, for example, claims by DOJ that inter-
agency litigation is nonjusticiable have completely blocked EPA efforts to
bring suit against federal polluters, including the Departments of Defense and
Energy.23  More telling, in the broader setting of enforcement against private
entities, DOJ control over whether an EPA referral is pursued means, by defi-
nition, that fewer judicial actions will be brought than if EPA was acting on its
own.
Litigation authority appears consequential for one other reason.  Congress
and its committees have more leverage over agencies and departments than
over DOJ.  In particular, a mutually reenforcing relationship exists among con-
gressional committees (who authorize and oversee federal programs), constitu-
ent groups (who benefit from federal programs), and departments and agencies
(whose power is enhanced by the expansion of federal programs).  Accordingly,
                                                          
21. Hugh Davis Graham, The Politics of Clientele Capture: Civil Rights Policy and the Reagan
Administration, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 103, 113 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998).
22. Debate over the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act likewise featured a fight over litiga-
tion authority, this time with pro-environmental interests in the House pushing for EPA self-
representation.  See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Admin-
istrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 470-72 (1989).
23. See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991).
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agency general counsel see themselves as “vicar[s] of Congress”24 not the White
House.  Beyond these symbiotic iron triangles, congressional committees are
better positioned than DOJ to punish programmatic agencies.  For example,
when Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.) informed EPA General Counsel
Ray Ludwiszewski that unless EPA complied with committee demands for
documents, “the escalation and the ratcheting up of the levels of unpleasant-
ness will commence,” Ludwiszewski meekly and knowingly responded, “I’m
painfully aware of that, sir. . . .”25  In sharp contrast, while DOJ officials are
subject to committee oversight, programmatic committees have less control
over DOJ’s budget or decisionmaking.26  For this reason, when legislative and
presidential interests are in conflict, DOJ officials are more willing, and there-
fore more likely, to disappoint lawmakers than are agency officials.27
Congress is well aware of these facts.  After all, lawmakers “see the choice
of administrative structures and processes as important in assuring that agen-
cies produce policy outcomes that legislators deem satisfactory.”28  The rise of
the legislative veto, its continued persistence after being declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court,29 and the more recent creation of an across-the-
board system of congressional review of agency rules30 all underscore this con-
clusion.  Congress’ efforts to limit presidential control of the administrative
state through its creation of independent regulatory agencies likewise suggests
that lawmakers see power sharing as a zero sum game; that is, the less power
vested in the White House, the greater Congress’ voice in defining agency be-
                                                          
24. Clean Air Act Implementation (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Envi-
ronment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 254 (1991) (remarks of EPA
General Counsel E. Donald Elliot).
25. Id. (Part 2) at 483 (1992).
26. The Judiciary Committees, of course, do have significant power over the DOJ.  For the most
part, however, the Judiciary Committees protect the DOJ from other committees.  See infra notes 68-
75 and accompanying text.
27. Along these lines, former head of Justice’s Environment Division Roger Clegg observed that
DOJ is not afraid of Congress the way other agencies are, and asserted that DOJ never considered
congressional reaction in deciding on a position.  In contrast, he described EPA as having a “battered
wife relationship” with John Dingell, head of the oversight committee of the House Energy and Com-
merce Committee.  See Interview with Roger Clegg, Former Head of DOJ’s Environment Division,
(Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 1994) (notes on file with author).  Furthermore, DOJ is willing to invoke
executive privilege and thereby limit committee access to internal executive branch deliberations.  Ex-
ecutive agencies and departments, however, are quite willing to turn over any and all requested infor-
mation to Congress.  For a first-hand account of conflicting DOJ and agency priorities, see ANNE M.
BURFORD & JOHN GREENYA, ARE YOU TOUGH ENOUGH: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF WASHINGTON
POLITICS (1986).
That said, DOJ is only relatively freer, not absolutely immune, from the influence of congressional
oversight, as illustrated by the battle over DOJ’s handling of environmental criminal enforcement.  See
infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
28. See McCubbins et al., supra note 22, at 432.
29. See generally Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 273 (Autumn 1993).
30. Under the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat.
847, which applies to all major rules issued by all agencies, rules cannot take effect for 60 days after
they are issued, during which time Congress has the opportunity to pass a joint resolution of disap-
proval derailing the rule.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (Supp II. 1996).
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havior.31  Finally, the intricacies of its own internal procedures, rules, and sen-
iority systems ensure that Members of Congress are keenly attuned to the sub-
stantive impacts that structural arrangements can have.
B.  The Relative Unimportance of Litigation Authority
Given the foregoing, it is indisputable that the allocation of litigation
authority matters, and that Congress knows, on some level, that it matters.
However, the reality is that many things matter a good deal more.
First, while arguments made in court affect outcomes, they do so less than
other things, notably, (to identify the obvious) statutory language and who the
judge is.  Since judges and statutes—not litigators and briefs—ultimately define
federal legal policy, litigation authority seems far removed from Congress’
principal concern, which is the substantive bottom line.
Second, whoever the lawyer is, in the grand scheme of things, her hands will
be largely tied by the agency's prior substantive decisions.  And those decisions
are subject to centralized control within the Executive Branch, notably through
review of proposed regulations and testimony by the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”).  Attorneys have limited discretion in defining the posi-
tions they advocate in court.  For example, when EPA regulations are chal-
lenged by environmentalist or industry interests, government litigators control
only the legal arguments made in defense of the agency’s action.  Ex ante deci-
sionmaking, including choices as to the substance of the regulation and the pro-
cedures utilized in promulgating it, are not part and parcel of litigation author-
ity.  As such, in defensive actions, litigation authority has limited policymaking
potential.32  On enforcement matters, litigation authority is more important.
Yet, if an enforcement scheme focuses on administrative, not judicial, actions,
the distribution of litigation authority may prove inconsequential.33
Indeed, the decentralization of litigation authority, by itself, might not even
neutralize White House control of executive agency litigation.  Just as the
President can centralize his regulatory agenda, the President is constitutionally
empowered to coordinate the legal policymaking of executive branch depart-
ments and agencies.  If agencies have the option of representing themselves or
using DOJ, both formal and informal pressures will almost always compel the
                                                          
31. Consider, for example, House Speaker Sam Rayburn’s (D-Tex.) advice to President Ken-
nedy’s FCC Chair Newt Minow:  “Just remember one thing, son.  Your agency is an arm of Congress;
you belong to us.  Remember that and you’ll be alright.”  ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS
OF BROADCAST REGULATION 89 (3d ed. 1982).
32. DOJ has a greater tendency to rely on “technical” defenses such as sovereign immunity, lack
of jurisdiction, statute of limitations, standing, mootness, and so on; agencies are somewhat more in-
clined to run litigation risks.  Thus, DOJ is able to advance certain cross-cutting legal policies in a way
that the agency would not.  It has less of a free hand, however, with regard to substantive policy that is
the subject of the litigation.
33. It may well be that both Congress and the White House view administrative cease-and-desist
authority as more potent than court-centered enforcement schemes.  Witness, for example, Nixon
Administration efforts to confine EEOC authority to judicial enforcement and thereby “maximiz[e]
the role of adversary proceedings in court so as to minimize the judgmental discretion of New Dealish
regulatory agencies.”  HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 426-27 (1990).
DEVINS.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  9:20 AM
Page 205: Winter 1998] AGENCY LITIGATION AUTHORITY 213
latter.34  Even if DOJ is wholly out of the picture, the President could nonethe-
less exert significant control over litigation.  Like OMB review, court filings
(including oral arguments) could be submitted to some clearinghouse, such as
DOJ, for approval or modification.  In performing this coordinating function,
DOJ, like OMB, could solicit the views of affected agencies.  Consequently,
rather than allow the EPA and the Department of Energy to advance radically
different interpretations of environmental statutes, decentralizing litigation
authority might well result in court arguments no different than those advanced
by DOJ today.
Even if the President lacked the energy or will to rein in agency attorneys in
this way, the fact remains that other mechanisms for coordinating and control-
ling policymaking are more important tools of ultimate control and will greatly
outweigh the loss of control from decentralized litigating authority.  Thus, the
most one might say is that decentralizing executive branch litigation authority
would not operate as an absolute roadblock to presidential control; instead, it
would only make control more costly and difficult.  Its value to Congress is ac-
cordingly reduced.
Third, the significance to Congress of the allocation of litigating authority is
further diluted by the fact that the other major lawyer’s task, counseling, is al-
most entirely decentralized within the Executive Branch.  Although DOJ is
available for legal advice to the agencies,35 and although, if sought, that advice
is considered binding,36 DOJ gives a legal opinion to agencies on a mere hand-
ful of the issues they confront.37  For the most part, agencies turn to their in-
house counsel for legal advice.  Thus, lawyering is largely decentralized; it is
just litigation that is not.38
Fourth, just as the White House can combat decentralized litigation
authority, Congress, too, has other mechanisms to further the goals that might
be thwarted by centralizing litigation authority in DOJ.  To begin with, Con-
gress can make the locus of litigation authority less consequential.  Citizen suit
provisions, for example, allow “private attorneys general” to bring enforcement
actions that the government is unwilling to file.  More significantly, Congress
                                                          
34. Many of the environmental statutes grant EPA authority to go to court on its own should DOJ
refuse to represent it, and a 1977 Memorandum of Understanding between DOJ and EPA envisions
EPA doing so.  See Memorandum of Understanding Between [DOJ] and [EPA], Civil Litigation, § 9,
42 Fed. Reg. 48,942, 48,943 (1977).  Nonetheless, EPA has virtually never exercised that power.  In our
interviews with lawyers in both agencies, those at DOJ considered it inconceivable that EPA ever
would; those at EPA could imagine it but acknowledged that it did not happen and was unlikely.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 512 (1994) (providing that department head “may require the opinion of the
Attorney General on questions of law arising in the administration of his department”).
36. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice in the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437,
489 (1993).
37. In 1991, for example, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel gave 625 opinions to outside agencies.
See John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, De-
scriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 423 (1993).
38. On the question of decentralized counseling generally and the ways in which it works to Con-
gress’ advantage in particular, see Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: The Governmental Role of
the Agency General Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY
AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143, 164-69 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995).
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can displace much legal policymaking by favoring administrative over judicial
enforcement.  When an agency can assess, say, up to $200,000 in penalties at a
rate of $25,000 per day, many cases that would have been referred to DOJ will
be handled by the agency itself.
Consider EPA.  It handles the huge majority of its enforcement administra-
tively through actions ranging from a warning letter or a notice of violation,
with a view to informal discussion and resolution, to agency-imposed penal-
ties.39  With the rarest of exceptions, administrative enforcement proceedings
are handled by EPA attorneys.  DOJ is simply not involved, unless, of course,
the agency’s final decision is challenged in court.  Furthermore, the huge ma-
jority of administrative enforcement proceedings settle.40  In these cases, there
is no formal hearing and no possibility of judicial review—and thus no court-
room lawyering, ever.
Fifth, Congress, through legislation, has ultimate control over policymaking.
Wherever litigating authority lies, Congress can and does limit policymakers’
and litigators’ discretion through highly prescriptive legislation.  The Internal
Revenue Code is a longstanding example of a detailed, and therefore con-
straining, legislative approach.  More recently, in the environmental, health,
and safety areas, Congress has frequently legislated with a breathtaking atten-
tion to detail.41  Much of this statutory minutia is a direct response to agency
failings.42
Sixth, and finally, Congress can rein in DOJ through a number of nonstatu-
tory devices.43  The saga of environmental criminal enforcement, for example,
makes clear that even DOJ—despite its best efforts—cannot always resist the
vise of congressional oversight.  Unhappy with the Bush DOJ’s decision to shift
control of environmental criminal enforcement to Main Justice from the decen-
                                                          
39. For fiscal year 1994, the respective numbers were the following: total administrative enforce-
ment actions, 3600; administrative penalty actions, 1596; civil referrals to DOJ, 403; and criminal refer-
rals to DOJ, 220.  See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT at 4-2, 4-4, 4-8 (1995).
40. See, e.g., Samuel L. Silverman, Federal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 75 MASS. L. REV.
95, 97 (1990) (reporting that “[w]ell over [90%] of Region I’s administrative penalty cases” settle).
DOJ’s only involvement in EPA administrative settlements is under the Superfund law, which calls for
DOJ approval of remedial action agreements and of cost-recovery settlements for over $500,000.  See
42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(d), (h)(1) (1994).
41. See Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential
Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 177-82 (1992); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Adminis-
trative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 824-40.
42. See generally Herz, supra note 41.  As Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) wrote with
regard to the 1986 Superfund amendments, because of Congress’ desire to limit agency “discretion,”
Congress (or at least subcommittee chair Markey) “felt that we had to make [all pertinent policy] deci-
sions for the agency.”  Edward Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and
Partner, 1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 969.  Similarly, “[a]lmost every section of the [1984] RCRA amendments
might be read as expressing a sense of frustration over the pace and scope of EPA action.”  Walter
Mugdan & Robert Adler, The 1984 RCRA Amendments: Congress as a Regulatory Agency, 10 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 215, 217 (1985).
43. Statutory amendment, of course, is subject to numerous internal and external hurdles, includ-
ing presidential veto.
DEVINS.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  9:20 AM
Page 205: Winter 1998] AGENCY LITIGATION AUTHORITY 215
tralized U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and believing that DOJ had been soft on envi-
ronmental crime, EPA’s House overseers conducted investigations, held hear-
ings, and, in general, made life miserable for DOJ officials in charge of envi-
ronmental crimes.44  By the time President Clinton took office, the fight over
environmental crimes was at full boil.  With the new Administration unwilling
to back away from the Bush DOJ’s position, the fight continued and escalated.
Finally, after the Senate Judiciary Committee (at the behest of EPA’s overse-
ers) held the nomination of Louis Schiffer, Clinton’s choice to head DOJ’s en-
vironment division, DOJ relented, allowing congressional staffers to question
DOJ line attorneys and reversing the Bush DOJ’s restructuring of environ-
mental criminal enforcement.  In the end, when up against Congress’ oversight
and confirmation powers, DOJ’s tradition of insulation and resilience could not
save DOJ priorities.
At the end of the day, then, the stakes with regard to the division of litiga-
tion authority just are not that high.  Congress and the White House, in critical
respects, can both overcome structural arrangements not to their liking; at the
same time, there are substantial inherent limits on what can be accomplished
by varying litigation authority.  Accordingly, there is little reason for Congress
and the White House to engage in battles royale over the division of litigation
authority.
IV
THE REALPOLITIK OF LITIGATION AUTHORITY
The foregoing discussion suggests why Congress does not focus on the ques-
tion of allocating litigation authority.  It does not, however, explain why some-
times it does focus on this question.  The foregoing discussion also presumes
that Congress thinks systematically, makes decisions on the merits, and oper-
ates in a political vacuum.  Of course, it does none of these things.  A more re-
alistic understanding of how Congress operates helps explain both why it ig-
nores the question of litigation authority in general, and why it pays attention
when it does.
A.  The Predominance of Fire Alarm Oversight
Congress likes to reward constituent interests.45  As public choice theory
suggests, lawmakers often devise legislation at the behest of powerful interest
groups.  When there is a dominant interest group, legislation will often specify
the devilish details of administration.  Yet, since the details of administration
                                                          
44. For a full account, see Theodora Galacatos, Note, The United States Department of Justice En-
vironmental Crimes Section:  A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Over-
sight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (1995).  For the deeply
aggravated response of a DOJ supporter to what was, in his view, congressional harassment, see Wil-
liam T. Hassler, Congressional Oversight of Federal Environmental Prosecutions: The Trashing of En-
vironmental Crimes, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074 (1994).
45. For a useful case study detailing the power of interest groups, see JOHN CHUBB, INTEREST
GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY (1983).
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cannot always be anticipated (when there is a dominant group) and since inter-
est groups often compete with each other (including industry and environmen-
talists, unions and business), legislation is often ambiguous.  As such, oversight
enables lawmakers to respond to ongoing constituency pressures.  More than
that, lawmakers may see a value in designing systems that create opportunities
for them to reward preferred constituencies.  That is, lawmakers may prefer
systems that sometimes fail their constituents in order to “fix mistakes” and
thereby cement their relationships with special interests.46  In other words,
lawmakers, by necessity and design, may well establish “a system of rules, pro-
cedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized
interest groups to examine administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect),
charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and seek remedies
from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.”47  Under such a system, lawmakers
respond to fire alarms sounded by constituent interests.
If congressional intervention is about putting out fires, allocating litigation
authority is rarely a useful tool.  First, for all the reasons set out above,48 the
payoff in terms of substantive governmental policy or action is small and uncer-
tain, reflected in general tendencies rather than in identifiable, consistent re-
sults.  Second, the payoff is too long-term to be of immediate use.  By shifting
litigation authority, Congress may prevent a problem from recurring, but it will
not solve an existing problem.  In short, allocating litigation authority, while
somewhat relevant to the design of the federal enforcement apparatus, simply
offers too small and too uncertain a payoff to meet the demands of constituent
interests once a fire alarm is sounded.
Consider, for example, a few instances in which Congress might have but
did not interfere with litigation authority, choosing instead alternate means to
the same end.  When the need to go to DOJ effectively prevented the EPA
from suing federal entities for violations of the environmental laws (all of which
apply to the federal government), Congress took two approaches.  First, it con-
ducted extensive oversight hearings into the question of the noncompliance of
federal facilities.49  Second, it acted legislatively by amending, in 1992, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (the basic law controlling the handling
and disposal of hazardous waste)50 to waive sovereign immunity for civil and
administrative penalties under federal, state, and local law, and expressly to
authorize the EPA to conduct administrative enforcement actions against fed-
eral facilities.51  The statute is silent on EPA lawsuits against federal facilities,
                                                          
46. Thanks to John McGinnis for this “Machiavellian” insight.
47. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Pa-
trols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
48. See supra Part III.B.
49. See, e.g., Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. (1987).
50. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922u
(1994)).
51. See Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (codified in
relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994)).
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and so skirts the question of litigation authority, instead endorsing administra-
tive enforcement and lawsuits against federal facilities by states and environ-
mental interests.
Consider, too, the ways in which Congress expressed its displeasure with
Reagan-era Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) appointees.  Fol-
lowing the FCC’s failure to defend diversity preferences for minority broad-
casters, Congress castigated the Commission for hiding behind “legalistic gob-
bledy gook” and demanded that the agency “send lawyers down to court who
will defend [preferences]—not take dives.”52  More importantly, Congress ap-
proved an appropriation rider prohibiting the Commission from calling into
question the legality of diversity preferences.53
Congress also made use of appropriation riders to express disapproval of
the Reagan DOJ's claims, in Bob Jones University v. United States,54 that racist
private schools were entitled to tax breaks.  Again, following its efforts to hu-
miliate the government’s lawyers before an antagonistic oversight committee,
Congress used its power of the purse.  Unlike its treatment of the FCC, how-
ever, Congress did not prohibit the Administration from speaking its mind in
court. Instead, Congress refused to reenact limitation riders restricting the en-
forcement of Carter-era nondiscrimination enforcement standards.55
In each of these cases, Congress might have legislatively redistributed litiga-
tion authority.  Its preference for oversight hearings, limitation riders, and the
creation of causes of actions for constituency interests, rather than the perma-
nent, legislative redistribution of federal litigation authority, reflect Congress’
preference for fire alarm oversight.  What Congress might achieve by redistrib-
uting litigation authority can also be obtained through other means.
But what about those instances in which Congress has in fact statutorily re-
allocated litigation authority?  These instances tend to be apparent exceptions
that prove the rule.  That is, they involve perceived failures, usually of en-
forcement, by a specific agency that are brought to Congress’ attention by spe-
cific, disappointed interest groups.
For example, in response to the perceived failure of DOJ to represent Fed-
eral Trade Commission (“FTC”) interests in court adequately, Congress
granted the FTC independent litigating authority in the 1975 FTC Improve-
ments Act.56  The explanation for Congress’ action is that the question of en-
forcement, and therefore the locus of litigation authority itself, had become an
acute problem.  Specifically, on matters referred by the FTC to DOJ, signifi-
cant delays in filing, unfavorable settlements, and the refusal to file cases had
                                                          
52. Minority Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearings on the H.R. 5373 Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong. 55, 54 (1986) (statement of Rep. Swift).
53. See Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
54. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
55. See Neal Devins, The Regulation of Government Agencies Through Appropriations Riders,
1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 496-97.
56. See Devins, supra note 12, at 269-77.
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become common practice.  Furthermore, DOJ successfully fought off FTC at-
tempts to enforce Commission subpoenas.57
Congress’ effort here is illustrative in one further way.  In 1975, the spectre
of Watergate limited President Ford’s ability to demand DOJ control of gov-
ernment litigation.  Indeed, the FTC bill was part of a larger Watergate-era at-
tempt to limit the “imperial presidency.”  At roughly the same time, Congress
limited White House authority in fiscal policymaking through the 1974 Budget
Act, considered making DOJ an independent agency, and debated legislation
to further insulate independent agencies from executive branch influence.58
Battles over litigation authority are part of the larger tugs and pulls be-
tween the White House and Congress over the control of the administrative
state.  Indeed, Roosevelt’s 1933 realignment of government litigation authority
was folded into his legendary “One Hundred Days” reform package.59  But
when public opinion turned against Roosevelt (for fear that he was dangerously
power hungry), Congress successfully resisted Roosevelt’s opposition to the
creation and maintenance of independent regulatory agencies, agencies that
were insulated from White House control, in part because they controlled their
own litigation.60  Absent congressional efforts to rein in a White House run
amok, however, Congress’ penchant for fire alarm oversight will keep the litiga-
tion authority issue safely on the sidelines.61
B.  Intensity of Preferences within Government
A final question remains.  We have established why Congress only occa-
sionally is interested in this question.  What we have not explained is why cen-
tralization in DOJ, rather than agency representation, is the norm.  Congress’
lack of interest alone would not produce a uniform result, and it would not nec-
                                                          
57. See FTC v. Guigon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968).
58. For relevant citations, see Devins, supra note 12, at 272 n.89.
59. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L.REV. 237 (1996).
60. See RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT’S GOVERNMENT 28-51 (1966).
61. We would mention one abortive congressional effort to rethink the allocation of litigation
authority that on the surface does not fit within the fire-fighting model.  In the late 1970s, the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs produced a scholarly, six-volume study of federal regulation.  See
1-6 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL
REGULATION (Comm. Print 1977-78).  Among its many recommendations, the study proposed that
independent regulatory commissions be authorized to sue and be sued, in their own name and repre-
sented by their own attorneys, in any civil actions apart from those in the Supreme Court.  See 5 id. at
xiii, 81.  This proposal was backed by a serious and lengthy substantive discussion.  See id. at 54-67.
In general terms, the proposal and the study are consistent with the general themes of this article.
The study was animated by and repeatedly returns to a single central goal: enhancing congressional
and minimizing presidential authority, particularly over the independent agencies.  But the study is not
firefighting.  It displays an awareness of the importance of litigation authority to overall authority and
of the link between structure and outcomes; it takes a systematic approach.  Ultimately, however, this
study is merely the apparent exception that proves the fire-fighting rule.  The key point is that Con-
gress did not write the study, and, of particular importance, it did not act on it.  Some of the study’s
proposals received careful attention, but none passed.  See Marshal J. Breger, The APA: An Adminis-
trative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV. 337, 342-43 (1986).  As for the litigation authority pro-
posal in particular, it did prompt John Glenn (D-Ohio) to introduce a bill, S. 4320 (1978), see 124
CONG. REC. 18723 (1978), but the proposal just sank beneath the waves.
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essarily favor DOJ over the agencies.  After all, the decentralization of litiga-
tion authority is also supported by mutually reenforcing triangular relations be-
tween agencies, interest groups, and congressional committees.  The answer lies
instead in the relative intensity of preferences among the governmental players.
Put simply, centralized litigation is far more important to the White House than
decentralized litigation is to Congress.
1. The White House.  Let us return to the watershed presidential effort at
centralization: Roosevelt’s 1933 reorganization.  Roosevelt’s initiative typifies
presidential efforts at centralization that have continued ever since.  By
centralizing litigation authority in a single department, Roosevelt sought to
strengthen his hold on the burgeoning administrative state.62  In other words, he
was paying close attention to structural arrangements.  Obviously, he saw the
distribution of litigation authority as consequential.  And for good reason.  In
part, just as decentralized arrangements bolster congressional power, the
President benefits from centralization.  More significantly, as Sheetmetal
Workers and Hercules suggest,63 intramural disputes within the Executive
Branch are commonplace.  Departmental and executive agency heads, while
named and subject to removal by a “unitary” president, are rarely appointed to
help put into place a coordinated White House-driven vision of some public
policy objective.  These individuals have different visions of the social good,
serve different constituencies, and are subject to different oversight
committees.  Unlike most agency and department heads, the Attorney General
is usually a close confidante of the President, in many cases someone who was
active in the President’s political campaign and possesses deep personal loyalty
to the President.  Correspondingly, since the mission of DOJ attorneys is to
represent the interests of the United States writ large, there is less chance that
either narrow constituent interests or congressional committees will capture
DOJ.  Put another way, DOJ attorneys may well see the President as their
client.
Furthermore, within the Executive Branch, DOJ’s preference to control
litigation far exceeds departmental and agency interests in decentralized ar-
rangements.  This goes beyond simply the endowment effect: the often ob-
served phenomenon that people value something more highly when it is some-
thing they have but might lose than when it is something they lack but might
gain.  Specifically, without the power to go into court, DOJ would be enfeebled.
Its status in government hinges on litigation authority.  Agencies, in contrast,
have less to gain from controlling litigation than DOJ has to lose.  Rulemaking
and administrative enforcement, powers that reside in agency heads, are far
more potent policymaking tools than litigation authority.  Moreover, when it
comes to litigation, agencies have significant control over the reach and content
of DOJ decisionmaking.  For example, when DOJ defends agency rulemaking,
                                                          
62. On this point, see Devins, supra note 59.
63. See supra Part III.A.
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DOJ is largely bound by agency decisionmaking.  Furthermore, agencies typi-
cally control whether to pursue an enforcement matter administratively or to
turn it over to DOJ.  Accordingly, when agencies are dissatisfied with DOJ rep-
resentation, they can make use of existing administrative enforcement author-
ity or, alternatively, ask Congress to expand administrative enforcement tech-
niques.
The consequence of these internal dynamics is that the White House often
takes a hard line position on congressional efforts to decentralize litigation
authority.64  The Reagan and Bush Administrations, for example, fought off
congressional efforts to create new repositories of independent litigating
authority.  Reagan pocket vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 be-
cause it empowered a special counsel to obtain judicial review of Merit Systems
Protection Board decisions.65  The Bush Administration likewise resisted con-
gressional efforts to allow EPA and Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment attorneys to bring court actions against other parts of the federal gov-
ernment.66
2.  Congress.  Given the intensity of presidential preferences, it is hardly
surprising that Congress, whose own preference for decentralized litigating
authority is, as we have seen, relatively dilute, yields.  Consider, for example,
congressional efforts to give EPA litigating authority as part of the 1984
amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).67  At
this time, EPA had a new, vigorous, white-knight administrator in William
Ruckelshaus, who was talking tough.  DOJ, on the other hand, was irritating
Congress substantially with assertions of executive privilege on environmental
enforcement materials.68  Moreover, thanks to massive press attention,
including a series of Doonesbury cartoons about environmental non-
enforcement, the question of who sues had itself become a fire.69  Even in this
setting, the proposal to give EPA litigating authority died quickly once White
                                                          
64. For a larger discussion of this point, see generally Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273 (1993).
65. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistle-Blower Protection Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1377 (Oct. 26, 1988).
66. See Memorandum from the American Law Division, The Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Afairs, Mar. 4, 1992
(discussing DOJ objections to establishing an Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight).
67. As reported out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, H.R. 2867, 98th Cong., §
11(d) (1983), the bill that ultimately became the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
would have imposed a 30-day time limit for DOJ to act on an EPA RCRA referral; if DOJ did not no-
tify EPA within 30 days of its plan to commence the action, or if it did not actually do so within 150
days, exclusive authority to litigate the matter would shift to EPA.
68. For a general account of relations between DOJ, EPA, and Congress during this period, see
Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA’s Hazardous Waste
Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L.J. 683, 734-50 (1988).  The executive privilege dispute, of
course, underlay Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
69. At an earlier stage of the process, Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), at the time chair of
the House Energy Committee, had defended this provision by stating that DOJ “has a very sorry rec-
ord on hazardous waste cases.”  Extend EPA Rules to Small Waste-Makers-House Energy Unit,
PLATT’S OILGRAM NEWS, May 13, 1983, at 5.
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House opposition surfaced,70 again suggesting the weakness of congressional
interest.
Just as the varying intensity of preferences within the Executive Branch is
relevant here, so too are conflicting preferences within Congress.  Thus far, we
have spoken about Congress as a unified entity.  However, its varying compo-
nents often have conflicting interests and preferences.  In this connection, the
internal dynamics of Congress’ committee structure to some extent reenforce
DOJ control of agency litigation.  The Judiciary Committee has a keen interest
in DOJ control of litigation.  If DOJ is without this control, Judiciary has less
power since the agency it oversees has less power.  In contrast, DOJ control of
litigation has a de minimis impact on oversight committee supervision of
agency decisionmaking or on the legislative policymaking accomplished
through the substantive committees.  Through legislation, hearings, and inves-
tigations, these committees can affect both the sweep and content of adminis-
trative enforcement and agency rulemaking.  These committees, moreover, can
place pressure on DOJ through hearings, investigations, and the like.  Conse-
quently, oversight committees are likely to accede to Judiciary’s strong prefer-
ence for DOJ control of government litigation.71
Consider two examples involving the House’s Judiciary and Energy and
Commerce Committees.  Both disputes involved EPA and arose in the mid-
1980s, a time when lackluster environmental enforcement made the question of
litigating authority unusually salient.  The first is Energy and Commerce’s ef-
forts to grant EPA litigating authority in RCRA cases.  As noted above,72 Judi-
ciary quashed this provision without breaking a sweat.  The second concerns an
instance in which Congress shifted authority from EPA to DOJ: the provisions
governing administrative settlements in the 1986 Superfund amendments.73
While Energy and Commerce supported limited DOJ involvement, Judiciary
succeeded in requiring that DOJ approve cost-recovery settlements.74  Citing
                                                          
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-198, pt. 3, at 7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5636, 5642.  Two
factors were at work in the abandonment of this proposal.  One was, as noted, the unified executive
branch opposition.  The other was that the provisions concerning litigation authority were reported out
of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and then struck by the House Judiciary Committee.
See id.
71. Congress’ committee structure, which encourages deference to subject matter specialists, also
encourages Judiciary Committee oversight of litigation and, with it, DOJ centralization of litigation.
See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (1991).
72. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
73. See Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 122, 100 Stat. 1678
(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 122 (1994)).
74. Specifically, EPA cannot enter into an administrative settlement calling for a private-party
cleanup except via a consent decree, which by definition requires a lawsuit and DOJ participation.  See
42 U.S.C. § 9622(d) (1994).  It can settle a claim for cost-recovery without going to court but must ob-
tain DOJ’s approval for any settlement over $500,000.  See id. § 9622(h)(1).  This provision was a di-
rect response to the perception that EPA had consistently entered into “sweetheart deals” with re-
sponsible parties.  See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1, at 59 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2841; Mintz, supra note 68, at 738.  Thus, §122 is in fact an example of Congress shifting litigating
authority, of a sort, as a way of putting out a fire; it is unusual only in that the shift is from the agency
to DOJ.
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the virtues of DOJ coordination and litigation expertise, it was successful in
demanding that DOJ play a leadership role in both approving Superfund set-
tlements and defending these settlements in court.75
V
CONCLUSION
DOJ control of agency litigation seems here to stay.  On the merits, whether
this is a good or bad idea is uncertain.  Regardless of the merits, however, pref-
erences within and between the branches, informed by constituency-driven
oversight, support DOJ control.  The division of litigation authority is about
power and, for better or worse, the question of who ought to speak the gov-
ernment’s voice in court is controlled by DOJ and its supporters.  Unless and
until litigation authority is viewed as a significant attribute of federal policy-
making, Congress, constituent interests, and agency heads will not resist the
status quo.  Thus, the question of whether the government’s interests are well
served by this arrangement may simply be irrelevant.  If so, it would not be the
first time that power and preference, not policy, determined outcomes in
Washington, D.C.
                                                          
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 3, at 33 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3056, 3038.
